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THE UK FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR:
A MODEL FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE
REGULATION?
Dr. Carole McCartney* & Emmanuel Amoako†
ABSTRACT
The use of an array of scientific techniques and technologies is
now considered customary within criminal justice, with technological
developments and scientific advancements regularly added to the
crime investigator’s arsenal. However, the scientific basis, reliability,
and fallibility of the application of such “forensic science” (and the
resulting scientific evidence) continues to come under intense
scrutiny. In response to apparently irremediable problems with the
quality of scientific evidence in the United Kingdom (UK), the
government created the role of “Forensic Science Regulator” in 2007.
The introduction of a regulator was intended to establish quality
standards for all forensic science providers in the UK, create a level
playing field in the forensic services market, and grant assurances
that all providers were producing reliable and robust scientific
evidence. A decade on, there remain questions over the effectiveness
of this model of forensic regulation. Although there has been
significant progress with initial aims and objectives and broad
stakeholder engagement, the Forensic Science Regulator still lacks
meaningful powers, and significant gaps in regulation remain.
Accreditation is not only inconsistent but may be superficial. The
Forensic Science Regulator faces serious resource restrictions with
debilitating limitations on the Regulator’s capacities, while wider
austerity measures throughout the criminal justice system hamper
efforts to raise standards in forensic science.
This Article will detail the first ten years of the Forensic Science
Regulator, outlining successes and ongoing challenges. It will
demonstrate that the UK model of forensic regulation has proven
only partially effective at minimizing the risks associated with
forensic science, while ensuring that the criminal justice system can
* Reader in Law, School of Law, Northumbria University.
† PhD Candidate, School of Law, Northumbria University.
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continue to secure high quality forensic scientific evidence that is
robust, reliable, and sustainable.
INTRODUCTION
While the forensic potential of scientific knowledge,
experimentation, and testing has long been recognized, the reliability
of forensic scientific evidence has come under intense scrutiny in
recent years.1 Considered a “state of the union” report with broad
acceptance and international pertinence, the 2009 United States
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report criticized inter alia: the
paucity of underlying research; lack of standards and accreditation of
laboratories; dramatic inconsistencies in levels of training of forensic
personnel; inattention to risks posed by cognitive contamination (socalled contextual bias); unprincipled variation in terminology and
forms of expression of scientific opinions; widespread failures to
disclose limitations and uncertainties in reports and testimony;
insufficient detail and explanation in reports; and a general lack of
funding and leadership across the forensic sciences.2 In late 2016, the
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST) released a further damning report on forensic science,
focusing on the lack of validity of many forensic science techniques.3
Such concerns are mirrored around the globe. In a comparative study
of forensic practice in the United States, Switzerland, and Australia,
Gary Edmond and Joelle Vuille suggest that critical failings in
1. We use the term “forensic scientific evidence” to encompass all evidence used in the criminal
justice process that has been undertaken by “forensic practitioners” or generated using recognized
“forensic” techniques or applications. There is a lot of “scientific evidence” that would not fit under this
banner, such as medical evidence, or evidence of engineers, etc. However, the term “forensic evidence”
is often cast far wider, and includes evidence that most people would not recognize as being generated
by “forensic science” techniques. We hope that “forensic scientific evidence” is thus broad enough to
include all forensic disciplines and techniques but not so broad as to encompass all potential evidence.
2. See generally COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD
(2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD]
3. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH. (PCAST), EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING
SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016).
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forensic science are ubiquitous.4 Yet, even domestic attempts to
regulate forensic science remain in their infancy, with any
international oversight scarcer still and of limited impact.
Perhaps uniquely,5 the UK6 has dedicated efforts to answering
critics of forensic science by attempting to ensure the uniform
provision of high quality forensic scientific evidence, primarily
through the creation of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR or the
Regulator). Established in 2007, the FSR was tasked with
establishing and monitoring quality standards and ensuring the
accreditation of suppliers of forensic services as well as dealing with
complaints and providing advice to the government.7 However,
questions remain as to whether the regulatory model adopted is
effective. On the one hand, the FSR was meant to create generic
standards for all forensic science providers in the UK and provide “a
light touch” in steering forensic service providers towards adopting
effective quality assurance systems and gaining appropriate
accreditation.8 But has this “light touch” rendered the Regulator a
paper tiger, leaving gaps in regulation and providing superficial
accreditation? Along with the rest of the public sector in the UK, the
Regulator also faces serious resource restrictions and operates within
a broader criminal justice system simultaneously being starved of
government funding.

4. Gary Edmond & Joelle Vuille, Comparing the Use of Forensic Science Evidence in Australia,
Switzerland & the United States: Transcending the Adversarial/Non-Adversarial Dichotomy 54
JURIMETRICS J. 221, 251 (2014).
5. Although we cannot say definitively, we are currently unaware of any international counterparts
or equivalent efforts that have taken the same approach to forensic science regulation in other countries.
6. The Forensic Science Regulator has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but both Scotland and
Northern Ireland voluntarily agreed to work in partnership with the Regulator and continue to work
within
the
same
guidelines.
About
Us,
FORENSIC
SCI.
REGULATOR,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/forensic-science-regulator/about, [https://perma.cc/Y95JFMC7] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
7. ANDREW RENNISON, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN 2008/09-2010/11 at
1, 2 (2008),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118922/Forensic_Science
_Regulator_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2P7-NCMR] [hereinafter BUSINESS PLAN 2008].
8. Id. at 3.
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This Article details the work of the first ten years of the FSR,
summarizing successes and ongoing challenges. It questions whether
the Regulator has achieved the aim of ensuring high quality forensic
science provision via examination of annual reports and business
plans as well as related documents, and it considers issues pertaining
to forensic science provision in the UK to draw conclusions
regarding the success of the regulation model employed.
I. Creating the Forensic Science Regulator
During the massive expansion of forensic science provision in
England and Wales in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, there were a series of highly critical reports commenting
upon the quality of forensic science provision and the risks associated
with poor quality forensic scientific evidence. The 1993 Report of the
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (the Runciman Report),
established in light of a series of infamous “Irish terrorism”
miscarriages of justice, made thirteen recommendations specific to
forensic science.9 Of these, the establishment of an oversight body
was deemed a priority. The Runciman Report recommended the
creation of a Forensic Science Advisory Council (FSAC) to serve as
a regulatory body for the forensic science community and an
independent source of advice.10 Just three years later, the 1996
Assessment and Implications of Centrifuge Contamination in the
Trace Explosive Section of the Forensic Explosives Laboratory at
Fort Halstead (the Caddy Report) evaluated the serious
contamination at a military forensic explosives laboratory and
advocated registration of individual forensic practitioners, while also
recommending the creation of an Inspectorate of Forensic Sciences.11
It was not until 1999, however, that any reforms were initiated,
with the establishment of the Council for the Registration of Forensic
9. THE ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. JUST., REPORT, 1991, CM 2263, at 211 (UK).
10. Id.
11. BRIAN CADDY, ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRIFUGE CONTAMINATION IN THE
TRACE EXPLOSIVE SECTION OF THE FORENSIC EXPLOSIVES LABORATORY AT FORT HALSTEAD 6–7, 23,
42 (1996).
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Practitioners (CRFP). This register was intended to provide courts
with a single point of reference through publication of a list of
“competent” forensic practitioners; ensure that registered
practitioners maintained competence; and discipline registered
practitioners who did not meet the required standards of “safe,
competent practice.”12 The CRFP would thus assure courts that those
presenting themselves at trial as expert witnesses were competent to
fulfill that role, making it a welcome and important step in that
regard. However, as a voluntary and self-selective system of
individual accreditation, the CRFP stopped far short of bringing
comprehensive and rigorous scrutiny to bear upon forensic science
and expert witnesses, many of whom were still able to testify in court
regardless of their registration status.13 The register was therefore
impotent, and continuing efforts to register practitioners were
proving futile. And so, the CRFP, ostensibly due to financial
difficulties, closed in 2009.14
Meanwhile in November 2004, in response to rapid developments
in the forensic marketplace prompted by the partial privatization of
the previously publicly funded national Forensic Science Service15
and the criticisms of the continued lack of regulation in light of highprofile miscarriages of justice involving “experts,” the UK Forensic
Science Society changed its status to one of a professional body.16
The Forensic Science Society partially took up the role played by the

12. ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, A REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS FOR THE
ACCREDITATION
OF
FORENSIC
PRACTITIONERS
17
(2009),
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/Review-of-Forensic-Practiti1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7DGZ-9DJQ].
13. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE ON TRIAL, 2004–05, HC 96-I, at
62–63 (UK).
14. Jamie Doward, Forensic Science Skills Threatened by Funding Withdrawal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4,
2009, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2009/apr/05/forensic-science-governmentfunding [https://perma.cc/ED5D-9JHE].
15. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE ON TRIAL, 2004–05, HC 96-II, at
Ev 26 (UK). The Forensic Science Service became a “Government Owned Company,” a for-profit
company, wholly owned by the UK Government, with the intention being to sell to a private interest in
the coming years. Id. at Ev 3.
16. About Us, CHARTERED SOC’Y OF FORENSIC SCIS., http://www.csofs.org/About-us
[https://perma.cc/8DGL-47BN] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
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CRFP by launching a Continuing Professional Development scheme
for members, a requirement of Chartered Forensic Practitioner
status.17 Although bodies, such as the Chartered Society, aim to
promote and develop forensic science quality standards and practice,
they represent a wider body of interests, including forensic education
and management, and do not provide specific certification or
assurance of practitioner competence.
With neither the Runciman Report’s nor the Caddy Report’s
recommendations leading to a regulatory body beyond the deficient
CRFP and with criticism of forensic science unabated, the House of
Commons Science and Technology Select Committee (Select
Committee) revisited the issue in its 2005 report Forensic Science on
Trial, making sixty recommendations on the regulation of forensic
science, the training of scientists, and related issues.18 The Select
Committee again recommended that the government establish a
FSAC to oversee forensic science and provide independent and
impartial advice.19 The FSAC would also be ideally placed to review,
or to commission inspections of, the use of forensic science across
the whole of the criminal justice system and to propose
improvements where necessary. After consultation subsequent to the
report, the government decided that a named individual would be
appointed Regulator, emulating other regulatory structures, with
responsibility for overseeing the quality of forensic science in
England and Wales.20 The new role was announced in July 2007,
explaining that the officeholder would advise the government and
criminal justice system on standards; identify and create new or
improved quality standards; provide advice and guidance to providers
on how to demonstrate compliance; and ensure the monitoring of

17. Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC), CHARTERED SOC’Y OF FORENSIC SCIS.,
http://www.csofs.org/Certificate-of-Professional-Competence-CPC [https://perma.cc/FB8A-FZ6R] (last
visited Mar. 18, 2018).
18. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 82–89.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 5.
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such standards.21 The Regulator was to be supported by a FSAC with
members from stakeholder bodies.22
A. The Role and Objectives of the Forensic Science Regulator
The first business plan of the new FSR in March 2008 outlined the
role of the Regulator and a set of objectives as well as a plan for the
first two years of operation.23 The FSR began by identifying what the
criminal justice system requires of forensic science providers:
(1) The delivery of forensic science services, using the
appropriate
available
scientific
techniques,
according to the highest professional standards;
(2) With efficiency, integrity, impartiality and accuracy
at every stage throughout the process;
(3) At a cost which represents best value for money,
within timescales which meet operational needs;
(4) Reflecting an understanding of the needs of the
specific customer and the requirements of the
[criminal justice system] as a whole; thereby
(5) Maintaining and enhancing public confidence in the
quality and reliability of forensic science in the
[criminal justice system].24
To ensure that the forensic science market could deliver on each of
these requirements, the FSR outlined a remit that would encompass:
(1) Scientific
quality
standards
relating
to
organi[z]ations providing forensic science services
to the [criminal justice system];
21. 12 Jul. 2007, Parl Deb HC (2007) col. 67WS (UK),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070712/wmstext/70712m0002.htm
[https://perma.cc/WQ9R-QPJT].
22. Id.
23. BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7, at 1, 2, 18.
24. Id. at 1.
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(2) Processes carried out within those organi[z]ations
which affect the quality of the forensic science
services provided to the [criminal justice system];
(3) New scientific techniques introduced in, or
adopted by, such organi[z]ations, before those
techniques are introduced; [and]
(4) The competence of individual forensic scientists.25
It was not expected that the FSR deliver all activities directly, but
that if organizations or mechanisms already existed to create and
monitor standards etc., that these would be used.
In the first Forensic Science Regulator Annual Report, published
in December 2009, the FSR set out a vision “[t]hat forensic science
delivered to the criminal justice system in the UK will consistently
meet the high quality standards and integrity expected by the courts
and the general public.”26 To achieve this, the FSR was to:
(1) “Provide direction and unity of approach to
achieving forensic science quality standards across
the UK;
(2) Place quality at the cent[er] of all forensic science
activities; and
(3) Create a quality standards framework around the
full range of forensic processes.”27
The FSR’s mission was:
(1) To influence the strategic management of UK
forensic science to place quality standards at the
heart of strategic planning;
25. Id. at 20.
26. ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR ANNUAL REPORT: DECEMBER 2009 at 1
(2009), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118900/FSRannual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B42X-4H9V].
27. Id.
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(2) To develop a set of ‘industry specific’ quality
standards for all forensic processes across the
dimensions of provider, practitioner and method;
(3) To establish, through the United Kingdom
Accreditation
Service
(UKAS),
effective
compliance assessment procedures;
(4) To use the Forensic Science Advisory Council as a
source of independent and authoritative advice;
(5) To maintain the use of specialist groups of domain
experts as the vehicle to deliver valid quality
standards; and
(6) To engage with the full range of stakeholders in
order to consult widely.28
In February 2013, the second Forensic Science Regulator Business
Plan: 2012 to 201729 was swiftly followed by the third Forensic
Science Regulator Business Plan: 2013 to 2014,30 when a change of
personnel took place and the new Regulator set out their priorities.31
Each document outlined aims accompanied by plans to achieve these
aims. Both individuals who have acted in the role of Regulator32 have
28. Id.
29. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN: 2012 TO 2017
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/143740/businessplan-2012-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV5Y-G5AB].
30. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN: 2013 TO 2014,
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229450/fsrbusiness-plan-1314.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY6B-ZMBF].
31. These ‘Business Plans’ also appeared to fulfill the role of ‘Annual Reports,’ where accounts and
progress would be reported as well as upcoming plans and there were no Annual Reports published
between 2010 and 2015.
32. There was an ‘interim’ Regulator to set-up the FSR. Forensic Science Regulator Newsletter, 3
FORENSIC SCI. REG. UNIT, Sept. 12, 2007, at 1, 2, http://netk.net.au/Forensic/UKFSAC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YYX5-NZCC]. The first Regulator was Mr. Andrew Rennison. 521 Parl Deb HC
(2011)
col.
23WS
(UK),
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-0113/debates/11011364000012/ForensicScienceRegulator [https://perma.cc/5JN3-RS8S]. Rennison was
followed by Dr. Gillian Tully, who took up the role in 2013, and has recently been confirmed as
Regulator until 2020. Forensic Sci. Regulator, Dr. Gillian Tully Reappointed in Key Role for Setting
Standards in Forensic Science, GOV.UK (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/drgillian-tully-reappointed-in-key-role-for-setting-standards-for-forensic-science [https://perma.cc/2L8TQSLD].
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stressed the importance of engagement with stakeholders, and they
regularly meet with “specialist working groups”: forensic science
practitioners, specialists, experts, and other stakeholders who can
undertake their own studies and advise the Regulator on quality
standards for specific forensic disciplines within the wider forensic
services to ensure industry-specific quality standards. The current
groups, each with their own terms of reference, are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

The FSAC,
The Contamination Specialist Group,
The Fingerprint Quality Specialist Group,
The Digital Forensics Specialist Group,
The DNA Analysis Specialist Group,
The End User Specialist Group,
The Forensic Pathology Specialist Group,
The Medical Forensics Specialist Group,
The Quality Standards Specialist Group, and
The Evidence Assessment Specialist Group.33

Despite slight variations in visions and differing aims over the ten
years since inception, the FSR role has not altered in any material
way. The Regulator continues to be a public appointee and operates
independently (i.e., not influenced by political pressure) working at
arm’s length of the Home Office.34 However, the FSR is funded by
the Home Office, and the Regulator reports to the Home Secretary
and is supported by three civil servants (suggesting quite a short
“arm”).35 The Regulator also acts as an advisor to the government
and represents the UK in international fora.36 The FSR’s

33. Membership, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/forensic-science-regulator/about/membership
[https://perma.cc/A54D-SQB4] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
34. Id.
35. About Us, supra note 6.
36. Id.
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responsibilities as currently articulated on the FSR website include
the following:
(1) “[I]dentifying the requirement for new or improved quality
standards[;]
(2) [L]eading on the development of new standards[; and]
(3) [W]here necessary, providing advice and guidance so that
providers of forensic science services can demonstrate
compliance with common standards[.]”37
The FSR’s attendant priorities are to see that:
(1) [F]orensic science services are delivered to
appropriate standards (usually an international
standard) tailored to meet the needs of the criminal
justice system and subject to independent and
effective assessments of quality[;]
(2) [H]igh quality advice and guidance is provided to
forensic science providers, ministers and others on
the forensic science requirements of the criminal
justice system[;]
(3) [T]here are effective means to investigate quality
failures and to address any issues[;]
(4) [T]here is effective collaboration with the
authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland to
achieve UK-wide quality standards[; and]
(5) [T]he UK is a strong voice on projects to develop
European or international standards for forensic
science.38

37. Id.
38. Id.
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In the discharge of these duties, the FSR continues to be advised and
supported by the FSAC, and quality standards are established via the
support of the nine specialist working groups.39
The principal and immediate task of the FSR was to develop
quality standards encompassing forensic science providers,
practitioners, and forensic methods. The FSR was charged with
producing a “Manual of Regulation,” defined as “a consolidated set
of guidance which describes, in some detail, why (covering strategic
aims and objectives) [and] how (including statement of principles to
be adopted) the Regulator, advised by the FSAC and supported by
Specialist Groups, will manage the whole regulatory process.”40 In
2011, Version 1 of the FSR Codes of Practice and Conduct for
Forensic Science Providers and Practitioners in the Criminal Justice
System (the Codes) were published, setting out accreditation
requirements for laboratories; a “Code of Conduct” for practitioners,
and a similar “Code of Practice” for providers.41
The Codes are built on the international standards ISO 17025:2005
(which outlines the general requirements for the competence of
testing and calibration laboratories), as interpreted by ILAC
G19:08/2014 in the context of forensic science processes,42 and ISO
17020 for organizations carrying out inspection.43 The Regulator
oversees accreditation (via the UKAS) using the international
laboratory testing ISO17025 standard for all laboratories that supply
forensic services.44 Because ISO17025 constitutes a generic
framework not specific to forensic laboratories, UKAS has issued
supplementary standards and has made tailored modifications for

39. Membership, supra note 33.
40. BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7.
41. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 6 (2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118949/codes-practiceconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/348J-TAP7] [hereinafter CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT].
42. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 2 (2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/499850/2016_2_11__The_Codes_of_Practice_and_Conduct_-_Issue_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9XA-BTXZ].
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id.
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forensic science. Both forensic anthropology45 and forensic
pathology46 have their own specific Codes of Practice, while there
are also appendices to the Codes for some disciplines, including:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Bloodstain pattern analysis,
DNA analysis,
Digital forensic services,
Video analysis,
Speech and audio forensic services,
Cell site analysis,
Fingerprint comparison, and
Fingermark visualization and imaging.47

Accreditation of providers involves on-site assessment by
technically competent assessors across a range of forensic
disciplines, assessing the training and ongoing competence of
practitioners within the organization, the validation of methods and
tests undertaken by the organization, and evidence of impartiality in
the organization’s activities.48 Assessment is managed on a four-year
cycle with at least annual on-site visits by UKAS.49 Quality-related
issues resulting from this independent accreditation assessment are
reported to the FSR.50 Accreditation is thus intended to provide an
45. Code
of
Practice
for
Forensic
Anthropology,
GOV.UK
(Oct.
3,
2017)
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/code-of-practice-for-forensic-anthropology
[https://perma.cc/S7LD-3A7N].
46. Forensic
Pathology:
Code
of
Practice,
GOV.UK
(Nov.
20,
2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/standards-for-forensic-pathology-in-england-wales-andnorthern-ireland [https://perma.cc/EN34-J3EE].
47. Forensic Science Provider: Codes of Practice and Conduct, GOV.UK (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-science-providers-codes-of-practice-andconduct#appendices [https://perma.cc/W9LU-LGW5].
48. Codes of Practice and Conduct, supra note 42.
49. ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FSR-R-618, REPORT INTO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF A COMPLAINT RECEIVED FROM THE GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE ON 7 MARCH
2012 REGARDING DNA EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY LGC FORENSICS
5 (2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118941/dna-contamreport.pdf [https://.cc/A2WN-PQVT] [hereinafter REPORT INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES].
50. GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2016–NOVEMBER
2017
at
9
(2018),
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authoritative assurance of competence in staff, the impartiality of
activities, and the reliability of evidence generated by the
laboratory.51 The Codes relating to practitioners are values and ideals
that should define the profession of a forensic practitioner. In total,
these standards are the minimum requirements expected in order to
provide a forensic science service to the criminal justice system.
Originally published in 2011, the Codes are updated when needed to
incorporate relevant developments in the forensic field. Some of
these changes have resulted in updates in 2016 (Version 3) and 2017
(Version 4), to reflect the new Criminal Procedure Rules, the
Criminal Practice Directions, and amendments.52
In addition to the Codes and appendices, the FSR publishes
detailed, stand-alone standards and guidance and currently has
published in the following areas:
(1) Forensic toxicology standards;
(2) Sexual assault referral centres and custodial
facilities: DNA anticontamination guidance;
(3) Method validation in digital forensics;
(4) Crime scene DNA: anticontamination guidance;
(5) Laboratory DNA: anticontamination guidance;
(6) Cognitive bias effects relevant to forensic science
examinations;
(7) Forensic service providers: validation guidance;
(8) Public comment guidance;
(9) Allele frequency databases and reporting guidance
for the DNA-17 profiling;

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674761/FSRAnnual_Rep
ort_2017_v1_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BVQ-KBNS].
51. Written Evidence Submitted by the UKAS (FST 0008), HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT (Mar. 2016),
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Science%20and
%20Technology/Forensic%20Science%20Strategy/written/31189.html [https://perma.cc/FW8V-CSVP].
52. See Rules and Practice Directions, JUSTICE, www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedurerules/criminal/rulesmenu-2015 [https://perma.cc/3W6S-WEDU] (last updated Apr. 11, 2017) (providing
access to the current version of the Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Practice Directions).
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(10) Fingerprint examination: terminology, definitions,
and acronyms;
(11) Alcohol back calculation for road traffic
investigations;
(12) Provision of human tissue to the defense;
(13) Time of death estimations;
(14) (Draft as of January 2018) DNA mixture
interpretation software validation;
(15) (Draft as of January 2018) DNA mixture
interpretation.53
There are also regular updates providing legal guidance on the
legal obligations of expert witnesses and those involved in forensic
pathology investigations54 as well as guidance on other related issues,
such as: Drug Driving: The Use of Legal Limits;55 Expert Report
Content;56 Non-Technical Expert Statements;57 and Completing the
‘History’ Section of a Forensic Pathologist’s Report.58 The FSR has
also produced the following guidance: Protocol: Using Casework
Material for Validation Purposes,59 Protocol on Forensic Science
53. Publications,
GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=forensic-scienceregulator&from_date=&keywords=&official_document_status=all&page=1&publication_filter_option=
all&to_date=&topics%5B%5D=all&world_locations%5B%5D=all [https://perma.cc/33JS-NTK4] (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018) (browse list or use the filters on the left-hand column to find specific
publications).
54. Legal Issues in Forensic Pathology and Tissue Retention: Issue 3 Guidance, GOV.UK (Dec. 10,
2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-issues-in-forensic-pathology-and-tissueretention-issue-2-guidance [https://perma.cc/9DQ2-NY8N].
55. Drug Driving: Use of Legal Limits, Issue 2, GOV.UK (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drug-driving-use-of-legal-limits-issue-2
[https://perma.cc/9ZVD-NM2J].
56. Expert
Report
Content,
GOV.UK
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/expert-report-content [https://perma.cc/5FU5-ZRM4].
57. Non-Expert
Technical
Statements,
GOV.UK
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/non-expert-technical-statements [https://perma.cc/76NMMX4T].
58. Completing the ‘History’ Section of a Forensic Pathologist’s Report, GOV.UK (Sept. 26, 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/completing-the-history-section-of-a-forensic-pathologistsreport [https://perma.cc/JN3B-L82V].
59. Protocol: Using Casework Material for Validation Purposes, GOV.UK (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-using-casework-material-for-validation-purposes
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Service Archive Complaints,60 and The Use of Photographs for NonCJS Purposes: Draft Guidance.61 The FSR commissions regular
audits of the work of forensic pathologists; having published a
protocol for these audits, the FSR has published the results of five
audits.62 Most of these documents have been published after
extensive engagement with both practitioners and stakeholders as
well as the public—with eighteen public consultations to date.63
Another important role of the FSR is to investigate complaints and
undertake reviews of performance when requested by Parliament.
These reports are also publicly available on the website, including a
performance review of the Scottish Police Services Authority (which
provides all forensic science services to the Scottish police).64 There
have been investigations into the biggest forensic providers in the
UK, including Cellmark Forensic Services, Key Forensic Services,
and LGC Forensics.65 In 2013, upon request by Parliament, the FSR
also published a preliminary report on the 1970s use of sodium
rhodizonate as a test to identify firearm discharge residue,
concluding, however, that a full review was not warranted.66

[https://perma.cc/XT46-3QGS].
60. Protocol on Forensic Science Service Archive Complaints, GOV.UK (Nov. 21, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-on-forensic-science-service-archive-complaints
[https://perma.cc/D4AZ-AGWQ].
61. Use of Photographs for Non-CJS Purposes: Draft Guidance, GOV.UK (Dec. 18, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/use-of-photographs-for-non-cjs-purposes-draft-guidance
[https://perma.cc/RA77-7UUN].
62. Forensic
Pathology
Audit,
GOV.UK
(Dec.
15,
2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-pathology-audit [https://perma.cc/KK8A-7YY3].
63. See id.
64. A Performance Review of the Scottish Police Services Authority, GOV.UK (Jan. 27, 2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-performance-review-of-the-scottish-police-servicesauthority [https://perma.cc/HN97-6WMB].
65. LGC were sold to Eurofins, a European forensic service provider, in 2017. Eurofins to Reinforce
Its Forensic Services Portfolio and Footprint with the Acquisition of LGC Forensics, EUROFINS (Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.eurofins.com/media-centre/press-releases-2017/2017-10-12/
[https://perma.cc/5R9L-PL66].
66. Report
on
Sodium
Rhodizonate,
GOV.UK
(Jan.
31,
2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fsr-report-on-sodium-rhodizonate-testing-in-the-1970s
[https://perma.cc/VXW7-RAVY].
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II. The Forensic Science Regulator: Ten Years of Progress?
There has been clear evidence of engagement by the FSR with a
broad variety of stakeholders beyond those sitting within specialist
groups and on the FSAC. In addition to an annual quality conference
hosted by the FSR, annual reports give details of a busy schedule of
external meetings and papers delivered at a wide variety of events.
The latest report stresses that there is a “continued priority” to speak
to as many “forensic experts, practitioners[,] and relevant managers
as possible.”67 The level of engagement has been impressive and is
going a long way toward achieving “Requirement 3” of the Forensic
Science Regulator Annual Report: November 2014–November 2015,
which requires a “shared understanding of quality and standards by
all stakeholders, including commissioners of forensic science, expert
practitioners, researchers and all end users, including the police, the
prosecuting authorities, [defense,] and courts.”68 The transparency of
the FSR is such that all minutes of meetings are promptly published
as well as regular newsletters, in addition to all the other publications
and public consultations. It is to be applauded that the FSR is so
transparent and engaged with the broader criminal justice
community. In the Forensic Science Regulator Annual Report:
November 2016–November 2017, the Regulator states, “[T]here
should be no doubt that progress is being made. The number of
organi[z]ations now able to demonstrate objectively the scientific
validity of their methods and the competence of their staff has
increased vastly. Many organi[z]ations are well on their way to
achieving the required quality standards.”69 However, the Regulator
concedes that this is an “ongoing process,” and her report goes on to
detail the challenges still facing the FSR, some of which we detail
below.70
67. TULLY, supra note 50, at 33.
68. GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014–NOVEMBER
2015,
at
4
(2015),
http://www.forensic-access.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/245172015_FSR_Annual_Report_v1_0_final_153002.pdf [https://perma.cc/J65H-PQMP].
69. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3.
70. Id.
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A. Continuing Challenges to Forensic Regulation
The Regulator was intended as an oversight body for all forensic
science providers in the UK, setting national quality standards and
ensuring compliance with these standards and the codes of practice.
However, there are ongoing challenges to ensure that all providers—
most importantly the police, but also small businesses and experts
called upon by the defense—seek and achieve accreditation. The
persistent lack of compliance from some providers continues to be a
problem, particularly in light of the government’s refusal to legislate
both to provide the Regulator with real powers in the face of
noncompliance and to put an enhanced admissibility test of scientific
evidence in the courts on a statutory basis. Without these legislative
reforms, the Regulator continues to be stymied in her efforts. There
have also been significant challenges to the FSR in maintaining a
steady hand in a turbulent marketplace, with financial pressures on
both police and private providers seeing significant turmoil. These
challenges, and the consequences of failure in these areas, will be
considered before turning to look at whether the introduction of the
FSR has raised standards across forensic science and the
complexities of regulation that are revealed by consideration of the
UK model.
B. Incomplete Accreditation and Lack of Compliance
When published, the Codes were accompanied by a timetable for
achieving compliance. In her first annual report in 2015, Dr. Gillian
Tully claimed that “much progress” had been made towards
compliance.71 However, in the third (current) business plan, the aims
include the primary goal of full compliance by the end of March
2017.72 Given that the adoption of the Regulator’s quality framework
was the primary aim of the FSR at the outset a decade ago,73 it is a

71. TULLY, supra note 68, at 4.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 4.
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concern that the Regulator is now reporting in 2018 that there are still
significant gaps in compliance.74 In particular, the message is not
positive for small or “micro-businesses” who “have chosen, for
financial reasons, not to move towards gaining accreditation.”75 In
April 2016—as part of collaborative efforts by the Chartered Society
of Forensic Science, the FSR, and UKAS to create a suitable
accreditation scheme for sole- and smaller-scale forensic providers—
a survey of over 70 forensic scientists found approximately 35% of
providers were either accredited or working towards accreditation
while 65% held no accreditation.76 Although the survey did not
capture whether a forensic provider was represented by single or
multiple participants, it provided a worrying insight into the current
landscape of accreditation in England and Wales when including
small and micro-providers.
The Regulator has often highlighted the difficulties in securing
accreditation, and the Select Committee, in 2016, echoed particular
concerns about police noncompliance, stating that the government
“must be clear that while some police forces may face particular
challenges in securing accreditation, there must be no failure to meet
the Regulator’s deadlines.”77 For police in-house activities, there is a
significant lag between increasing forensic activities undertaken and
the adoption of relevant quality management systems (QMS).
Previous QMS (via accreditation to ISO 9001) targeted limited
activities such as DNA recovery and fingerprint enhancement,78 but
74. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3.
75. Id.
76. Engagement Workshop, 86 INTERFACES 4, 4–6 (2016). Sole traders were 32% of respondents;
14% represented SME-small providers (50–249 staff), 34% for SME-micro (2–9 staff), 8% for SMEmedium providers, and 12% for large providers (250 or more staff). Id.
77. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY, 2016–17, HC, ¶ 55
(UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmsctech/501/50102.htm
[https://perma.cc/PQ2W-DSZV].
78. See HOME OFFICE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY: A NATIONAL APPROACH TO FORENSIC
SCIENCE DELIVERY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2016, Cm. 9217, at 9 (UK)
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/506683/54493_Cm_9217
_Forensic_Science_Strategy_Print_ready.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC3R-G8L8]. Current reports show that
the number of police forces with accredited QMS for DNA recovery and fingerprint enhancement are
thirty-four and thirty-six respectively, with sixteen units accredited to other areas. Id. at 11–14.
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they do not cover all activities now undertaken by police. For
example, there is no uniform protocol for the classification of
firearms across forces involved in the provision of firearms evidence.
Even with UKAS appending supplementary standards to
ISO17025 to make it forensic-specific, no standard can truly regulate
every aspect of a practitioner’s work, even in a highly regulated
laboratory environment. Even more difficult, if not impossible, is
effective oversight of crime scene examination and evidence
retrieval, particularly where police personnel work without external
supervision. Scenes of crime examinations pose significant
challenges and while included within the Regulator’s accreditation
schedule (under the ISO17020 standard), few police scientific
support services are currently accredited.79 Yet, effective oversight of
evidence management is essential if evidence generated from crime
scenes is to be relied upon.
The latest annual report notes that there has been a particular
failure to secure accreditation in relation to digital forensics, and, at
the time of this writing, the deadline of October 2018 for fingerprint
comparison is fast approaching without confidence of full
compliance by that date (having been moved back substantially on
several occasions).80 The provision of digital forensic evidence is of
particular concern at a time when there is a reported decrease in the
demand for traditional forensic techniques, such as DNA and
fingerprints, while the demand for digital forensics is increasing.81
Although there has been significant progress in terms of method
validation and staff competence—driven by the October 2017
deadline for achieving accreditation—as of January 2018, up to thirty
commercial organizations are providing digital forensics yet just four

79. ISO-17025 Mandatory for Digital Forensics in the Criminal Justice System, INTAFORENSICS
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.intaforensics.com/2017/09/19/iso-17025-mandatory-for-digital-forensicsin-the-criminal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/X3SF-665J].
80. TULLY, supra note 50, at 2.
81. John Flatley, Crime in England and Wales; Year Ending June 2017, OFF. FOR NAT’L STATS.,
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandw
ales/june2017 [https://perma.cc/VS5S-HSBU] (last visited July 8, 2018).
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have gained ISO17025 accreditation.82 The Regulator has particular
concerns about micro-businesses and sole traders in digital forensics
postponing the effort and cost of accreditation until the Regulator has
powers to force their hand, especially when, “[a]rguably, the risks are
higher for sole traders, some of whom may not be in regular
scientific debate with colleagues and may over time become outdated
or even marginalized in their opinions.”83
C. The Regulator’s Powers
Achieving full compliance then remains challenging, and yet the
Regulator must strive towards this goal with no significant powers.
The FSR was created under the Royal Prerogative, with no statutory
basis and no powers to enforce standards. The FSR is prevented from
using any “direct economic measures,” such as fines or other
monetary incentives, disincentives, or penalties.84 The FSR instead
relies upon indirect measures to secure compliance, including
“harnessing active support from key stakeholders” and using
“informal sanctions,” such as:
[d]eveloping a climate within which suppliers who are
unable to evidence compliance with quality standards will
find it difficult to secure contracts to supply forensic
science services to police forces and others; [and]
[e]ncouraging courts and counsel to expect testimony given
by expert witnesses to be underpinned by evidence that the
science complies with the requisite quality standards.85
In the 2017 annual report, the FSR asserts that those providers “not
moving towards compliance should be in no doubt that their services
will gradually receive fewer commissions and their practitioners will
82.
83.
84.
85.
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face more challenges in court.”86 Frustration with the lack of
government action is now apparent, evidenced by the Regulator
setting out a chronology of unfulfilled government pronouncements
dating back to 2005 that promised the Regulator powers. In 2011, the
Select Committee recommended again that statutory powers be
granted, a proposal that the government agreed to keep “under
review.”87 The Select Committee made the same recommendation
again in 2013, demanding action by March 2014.88 This led to a
public consultation, which the government responded to in July 2015,
stating that support for statutory powers had been found to be very
high, and the issue would be addressed in the forthcoming Forensic
Science Strategy.89
The following year duly saw publication of the Forensic Science
Strategy, where the government proclaimed a vision for forensic
science that includes “a clearer system of governance to ensure
quality standards and proper ethical oversight, and a cost effective
service that delivers . . . robust and relevant forensic evidence.”90 The
document asserts that the “legitimacy and capability of forensic
science” will be enhanced with proposals developed “to give the
Forensic Science Regulator statutory powers, put the current remit
and the associated Codes of Practice on a statutory basis[,] and
enable the Forensic Science Regulator to investigate noncompliance
where necessary.”91 The Select Committee was unconvinced and
“left with serious doubts about the [g]overnment’s commitment to
deliver this.”92 Yet, in 2017, the Regulator reported, “[I]t is becoming

86. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3.
87. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, SEVENTH REPORT,
2010–12, HC 855, at 80 (UK).
88. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, SECOND REPORT,
2013–14, HC 610, at 62 (UK).
89. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE: RESEARCH COUNCILS UK
RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE’S SECOND REPORT OF SESSION, SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT, 2013–2014, HC
843, at 9.
90. HOME OFFICE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY, 2016, Cm. 9217, at 6 (UK).
91. Id. at 7, 15.
92. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, FOURTH REPORT,
2016–17, HC 501, at 24.
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clear that not all police forces are fully committed to reaching the
required standards. . . . Statutory powers for the Regulator are now
needed in order that those organi[z]ations that have not committed
the resource and effort required to attain the standards can be induced
to do so.”93
In Parliament later that year, the Minister of State for Policing and
the Fire Service stated, “[W]e committed to place the Forensic
Science Regulator on a statutory footing by the end of this
Parliament. We are seeking the appropriate parliamentary
opportunity to do that.”94 As of January 2018, while appearing
tantalizingly close, the “clearer statutory role” promised has still not
been forthcoming, and proposals for the powers have not yet been
publicly revealed. The Regulator says that the situation is
“disappointing.”95
Studies have shown a significant correlation between strong and
effective regulatory frameworks and sector outcomes,96 and critics of
the FSR can point to its inability to authoritatively enforce the
adoption and compliance of the standards.97 The Codes are not
mandated by law, but their compliance is meant to be “not
optional.”98 Yet, providers lacking accreditation are still able to
undertake work while others “that have met the quality standards

93. GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2015–NOVEMBER
2016,
at
7,
9
(Jan.
6,
2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/581653/FSR_Annual_Re
port_v1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZDW-MKTL].
94. 27
Nov.
2017,
Parl
Deb
HC
(2017)
col.
28
(UK)
https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2017-11-27b.22.10 [https://perma.cc/4F42-9Q8J].
95. TULLY, supra note 50, at 33.
96. CARY COGLIANESE, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., EXPERT PAPER NO. 1,
MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION AND
REGULATORY
POLICY
35
(2012),
https://www.oecd.org/gov/Regulatorypolicy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6YY-TGU8].
97. Written Evidence Submitted by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (FST0006), HOUSES OF
PARLIAMENT
(Mar.
2016),
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Science%20and
%20Technology/Forensic%20Science%20Strategy/written/31154.html%20Accessed%2030%20January
%202018 [https://perma.cc/3P3B-QHA8].
98. 4 GILLIAM TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 2 (2017).
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have not yet been fully rewarded through the contracting process.”99
Like its predecessor the CRFP, the FSR is ultimately hampered by
lack of enforcement powers. This has also permitted providers—most
obviously the police—the ability to dictate the pace of adoption of
quality standards. Accreditation remains an additional but optional
“cost,” with some providers—including the police—avoiding the
stringent quality measures required for accreditation.100
D. Forensic Regulation and the Courts
Without statutory powers, the Regulator relies upon cooperation
and external requirements, such as the Criminal Procedure Rules and
Criminal Practice Directions, to effect compliance with the Codes.101
Prosecutors, lawyers, and judges are thereby incorporated into the
quality control machinery for forensic science. However, this is
frustrated by courts that continue to admit evidence from
nonaccredited laboratories or experts (which they are perfectly
entitled to do). The courts in England and Wales are required to make
decisions about admissibility in line with the Criminal Practice
Directions, which gives a list of factors to consider, ultimately hoping
this will ensure only “sufficiently reliable” scientific evidence is
admitted at trial.102 But are they competent to make informed choices
and decisions? Are the police mindful of such criteria, particularly
when the majority of forensic evidence never reaches a courtroom
and may simply be used to “steer” a police inquiry or be used as
“intelligence”?
The gatekeeping role of trial judges in ensuring the reliability of
expert evidence has been extensively discussed in common law
jurisdictions with admissibility standards widely debated.103
99. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3.
100. TULLY, supra note 98, at 2.
101. See, e.g., Criminal PD 2015 [2015] EWCA Crim 1567, [11], https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/crim-pd-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/98NQ-AEAV].
102. Id.
103. Carole McCartney, Legal Rules, Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (G.J.N Bruinsma & D.L. Weisburd eds., 2014).
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However, attempts at scientific rigor have encountered many
challenges in adversarial courtrooms. The admission and examination
of scientific evidence in English criminal trials is subject to a
complex set of evidentiary rules and procedural practices, which do
not smoothly align with accepted scientific principles. While trial
counsel can always cross-examine an expert witness on the expert’s
qualifications, experience, and expertise, neither lawyers nor judges
are generally well qualified to assess scientific practice or
standards,104 with courts still “unable to tell the difference between
‘expert opinion’ and ‘scientific evidence,’ too often retreating into
the simplistic default assumption that everything said by a bona fide
expert is necessarily ‘scientific.’”105
In lieu of requiring formal registration or professional accreditation
as a precondition of admissibility, courts might rationally opt instead
to insist upon forensic professionals working within an “accredited”
or quality-assured laboratory (or equivalent environment). This
transposes quality assurance from the individual to the institutional
level. What we have seen, however, is institutional accreditation
remains patchy, with many gaps, particularly among police
organizations and small businesses (especially those who undertake
defense work). The flaws with this regulatory framework remain in a
marketplace where accreditation is expensive yet optional, and police
are continuing to take forensic work in-house without seeking
accreditation.
E. Police Provision and the Forensic “Market”
The FSR was expected to fill the vacuum of regulation and solve
the problems identified in a growing number of critical reports. Yet,
the existence of a regulator was to prove even more critical when the
government announced at the end of 2010 that it was to close the
104. See Carole McCartney, John Cassella & Paul Chin, Lowering the Drawbridges: Forensic and
Legal Education for the 21st Century, FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y AND MGMT., May 2011, at 4.
105. PETER GILL, MISLEADING DNA EVIDENCE: REASONS FOR MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 11–12
(2014).
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Forensic Science Service, a body previously looked to for national
standards and advice, heralding a move by the UK into unchartered
waters: a completely private national forensic science market.106 The
FSR had referred to a “fully functioning market with the right
services, at the right price, delivered to the appropriate standard” in
the first business plan in 2008,107 stating that it was essential for the
integrity of the criminal justice system that “a level playing field
exists for all suppliers and that quality standards are maintained in
the face of the growing market and increased competition.”108 The
role and success of the FSR was then crucial to ensuring the
sustainability of a wholly profit-driven marketplace and the
avoidance of a “race to the bottom.”
Closure of the Forensic Science Service and public sector austerity
measures have encouraged police services to take more forensic work
in-house. While the lack of accurate or accessible data on forensic
science services spending has been regularly identified as
problematic,109 the Home Office admits to approximately a 40%
decline in police spending on external forensic services between
2010 and 2015–2016,110 with expected further falls of 3% in 2016–
2017.111 Independent research concludes that “the continued fall in
spending put[s] more pressure on the [private sector forensic service
providers’] turnover and profitability and, therefore, poses questions
about the sustainability of the market.”112
While the police increase their forensic workload, the marketplace
for forensic service providers then shrinks, leaving providers

106. Paul Rincon, ‘Higher Cost’ of Forensic Science Service Closure, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-21251162 [https://perma.cc/ZLL7-FKC7]. Albeit the
Forensic Science Service had been operating as a Government Owned Company (GovCo) since 2005,
charging for their services. Id.
107. BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7, at 19.
108. Id.
109. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE HOME OFFICE’S OVERSIGHT OF FORENSIC
SERVS., 2014–15, HC, at 1 (UK).
110. HOME OFFICE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY, supra note 78, at 11.
111. Gary Bandy & Jean Hartley, Debate: When Spending Less Causes a Problem, 38 PUB. MONEY
& MGMT. 52, 53 (2017).
112. Id.
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vulnerable and the market lacking resilience. Indeed, there have been
few “success” stories of flourishing businesses with “big” players
cross-subsidizing the forensic arms of their business. Of the “full
service forensics providers,”113 LGC Forensics recently sold its
business to a European company,114 while Key Forensics, the third of
the big three providers, went into administration in January 2018,
leaving just two providers standing.115 Meanwhile, many small
businesses have been unable to continue operating. This has led to a
dangerous situation with respect to available expertise in some
disciplines, particularly fiber analysis and other less often used
techniques. The Regulator reports that there are now only twelve
fully qualified toxicology reporting officers in England and Wales.116
Demonstrating the fragility of the market and the risks that this poses,
the collapse of digital forensics providers can leave police and
defense solicitors trying to retrieve themselves, and raising
significant problems over chain of custody authentication. The
Metropolitan Police have also been forced into spending millions of
pounds to keep Key Forensics afloat for three months, while they
finished work on thousands of live criminal cases from thirty police
forces.117
Such business failures require expensive contingency plans, and
yet the privatization of the market was intended to save government
money by introducing competition, which would lead to a reduction
in the price of services. By creating a competitive market where
prices must be low to win contracts, some forensic providers are

113. See, e.g., Forensic Services, EUROFINS, https://www.eurofins.co.uk/forensic-services/
[https://perma.cc/V753-BVYZ] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
114. Eurofins to Reinforce Its Forensic Services Portfolio and Footprint with the Acquisition of LGC
Forensics, BUSINESSWIRE (Oct. 12, 2017, 1:30 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171011006395/en/Eurofins-reinforce-Forensic-servicesportfolio-footprint-acquisition [https://perma.cc/X39A-WH8C].
115. KEY FORENSIC, https://www.keyforensic.co.uk/ [https://perma.cc/NT94-DS2E] (last visited Mar.
19, 2018).
116. TULLY, supra note 50, at 8.
117. Fiona Hamilton, Police Foot the Bill After Collapse of Forensics Firm, TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018,
12:01 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/police-foot-the-bill-after-collapse-of-forensics-firm-keyforensic-services-limited-bg5nbxkxt [https://perma.cc/YB2M-FXRB].
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unable to continue supplying cost-effective services. This becomes
even more problematic by additionally asking struggling providers to
meet the significant costs of accreditation. The Regulator has
commented that it may not be simply a matter of the
commercialization of forensic science, but that “too much money has
been and is continuing to be driven out of forensic science
provision.”118
At the same time as police forces undertaking more forensics work
internally creates risks to the market, “[p]rivate sector companies are
concerned that police force laboratories may be able to operate more
cheaply by using police premises without charge or by delaying
meeting UK accreditation standards.”119 As seen, police in-house
forensic services are not yet uniformly subject to the same quality
standards that apply to commercial providers, even though it was
stated in the original 2008 business plan that “differential standards
would operate against the public interest and increase the risk of
challenge in the courts.”120 It is difficult to see how lower standards
for police forensics could be in the public interest, and such different
standards increase the risk of flawed results being relied upon or
challenged in the courts. Indeed, the police-led initial screening and
selection of exhibits for testing is often the most critical point in the
forensic process. Poor decision-making at this juncture,
contamination of exhibits, or weak chain of custody records
jeopardize any further testing that may be undertaken under stricter
quality regimes. Criminal prosecutions, such as the infamous Irish
Republican Army bombing in Omagh, were ultimately defeated by
poor police practices at the crime scene and an ambiguous chain of
custody for exhibits.121

118. TULLY, supra note 50, at 9.
119. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE HOME OFFICE’S OVERSIGHT OF FORENSIC
SERVS., 2014–15, HC, at 1 (UK).
120. BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7, at 4.
121. R. v. Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49 (N. Ir.).
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III. Raising Standards in Forensic Science?
Given that the FSR was created in the shadow of miscarriages of
justice and concerns about the quality of forensic science provision,
with the ultimate aim of regulation being the assurance that all
forensic evidence is of a high quality, have standards been raised in
the UK? A reliable answer would require an accurate gauge to
measure standards pre- and post-creation of the FSR, which does not
exist. But if one were to expect that errors, mistakes, or misconduct
were now becoming consigned to history, then the FSR role in
investigating complaints would be diminishing. Yet, the converse is
true: increasing numbers of cases are being reported to the FSR for
investigation. While it may be reassuring that at least now we are
hearing of errors and that the standards regime ensures that errors are
now recognized and addressed, there is still ample room for concern.
By 2013, sixty complaints were received by the first FSR during
his five-year tenure.122 Between 2015 and 2016, however, quality
complaints rose from thirty-six to fifty-seven, rising again to sixtyfive in 2016–2017,123 with an increase in the complexity of the
reported issues and risks categorized as low, medium, or high
according to the severity of the failure and potential consequences.
Fourteen complaints were considered “high risk” in 2016–2017.124
Some cases have been “near misses,” such as DNA contamination at
the LGC forensic laboratory in 2012.125 Adam Scott had been
charged with rape in October 2011 after a plastic tray containing a
sample of his DNA (from an unconnected, earlier sample) was reused in the analysis of a swab from the rape victim, providing a DNA
“match” in the rape case.126 He denied traveling the 190 miles from
122. Andrew Rennison, Message from the Regulator, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR NEWSL. (Forensic
Science Regulator, Birmingham, UK), Dec. 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/268605/FSR_22_1_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CB4Y-Y72W].
123. TULLY, supra note 50, at 30.
124. Id.
125. RENNISON, supra note 49, at 2.
126. Vikram Dodd et al., Forensics Firm Investigated Over DNA Blunder in Rape Case, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 9, 2012, 1:24 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/mar/09/forensics-firm-investigated-
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his home to the scene of the crime, and his lawyer pressed for further
testing, uncovering the error, despite LGC Forensics initially failing
to consider contamination when the investigating officer raised
concerns about the DNA match.127 Charges were eventually dropped,
while some 26,000 other samples were re-tested with no further
errors identified.128 In another contamination case, during a lengthy
and perplexing police investigation into the death of an MI6
employee, forensic scientists provided police with a DNA profile
from the bag in which the body was found.129 The police
subsequently spent a year attempting to trace the individual
responsible for leaving the DNA, to no avail. It was later discovered
that an individual manually entering the DNA profile had transposed
the numbers “three” and “five.”130 This typographical error led to the
costly pursuit of a non-existent individual.131
The FSR’s post-investigation measures—ranging from advice on
steps to avoid recurrence of the issue to modifying standards and
guidance—are influenced by the issues raised. Again, without
meaningful powers, such “advisory” measures are all that can be
expected. Yet, the cost of errors and malpractice are significant,
notwithstanding the serious risk of miscarriages of justice and the
reputational harm to the criminal justice system. While the Codes
seek to reduce the risk of mistakes, no accreditation can prevent a
scientist from faltering or employees within accredited organizations
from consciously or unwittingly engaging in malpractice. The
expansion of private sector provision and police in-house services—
with a demand for profitable (for the private sector forensic service
providers), cost-effective, and sustainable provision—have increased

dna [https://perma.cc/HJZ7-SU85].
127. Id.
128. DNA Rape Sample Procedures ‘Not Adequate,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19782917 [https://perma.cc/BX3A-AQMB].
129. Scientists Apologise to Family of MI6 Spy Gareth Williams for DNA Error, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30,
2012, 9:38 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/mar/30/gareth-williams-death-dna-error
[https://perma.cc/HVD4-QHHV].
130. Id.
131. Id.
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the complexity of the environment with some routine forensic testing
now subcontracted to nonspecialists or undertaken by less qualified
police personnel.
And yet there is still heavy reliance upon the professional integrity
of individual practitioners. It was not long ago that even forensic
scientists themselves conceded that forensic science is not
sufficiently well-developed as a profession to have the full
characteristics of a profession in place.132 Practitioners may face
institutional pressures, which are supposedly balanced by their
scientific professionalism; however, customers demanding “useful”
scientific assistance may refuse to pay for inconclusive test results or
choose other providers who are more obliging. And what about the
situation where the scientist is aware that a potentially exculpatory
test has not been ordered? There is no legal duty to pursue every
conceivable avenue of scientific inquiry or every possibility of
exculpation, and police will rarely order extensive tests (with their
eye on budgets). Private consultants are constrained by costs and
keeping their customers happy, hoping to gain a reputation for
satisfying consumer expectations, in order to win and retain market
share.
High-profile miscarriages of justice in England and Wales fan
suspicions that scientists may be too easily influenced by the police
when undertaking forensic testing and reporting results. The Codes
state that all forensic practitioners should be governed by the
principles of “independence, impartiality[,] and integrity.”133
According to the Regulator, organizational structures do not hinder
working toward these principles,134 yet this seems overly optimistic if
a scientist is directly employed by, or works directly alongside, the
police. Although one might wish to believe in the integrity of all law
enforcement and forensic science personnel wherever institutionally

132. Sheila Willis, Forensic Science, Ethics and Criminal Justice, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
SCIENCE 542 (Jim Fraser & Robin Williams eds., 2009).
133. CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT, supra note 41, at 9.
134. Id. at 12–13.
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located, it would be naive to abandon quality assurance mechanisms
and frameworks for wishful thinking.
IV. The Challenge of Forensic Regulation
The FSR initially articulated a “risk model,” identifying five
categories of risk: the generation of evidence which contributes to a
miscarriage of justice (false convictions or false acquittals); evidence
which misleads or fails to contribute where possible to a criminal
investigation; situations where there is a “public interest” (left
undefined); and conditions threatening market failure.135 Utilizing a
risk model requires quantification of the “risk” posed by any
particular procedure or practice. Thus, there must be an error rate—
corresponding to identifiable errors—or known limitations of any
given method. However, a significant flaw in the Regulator’s risk
model is that relevant error rates and limitations for common forensic
science techniques remain largely undetermined.
Even assuming the injection of significant further resources would
provide accurate error rates, it is questionable whether risks can be
meaningfully quantified given the inherently contextual nature of
forensic science evidence. Without known error rates, can a
laboratory profess to be working within acceptable parameters? Who
decides what level of error is “acceptable”? For example, how often
should an acceptable system of fingerprint analysis be expected to
produce false “matches”? What range of false “matches” is
compatible with a practitioner or laboratory performing to an
acceptable standard? Such questions, of course, are not purely
scientific. Acceptability turns, in part, upon the criminal justice
system’s values and public tolerance of forensic errors. Significant
further research into error rates, forensic techniques, technological
limitations, and practitioner bias needs to be undertaken before an
effective risk model can be designed and implemented.

135. Id. at 15.
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Even with dedicated resources (including significant research
funding), there are still inherent difficulties in reaching agreement on
areas of ongoing scientific controversy. Recent debates surrounding
Low Template DNA demonstrate that forensic scientists may become
entrenched in opposing views.136 Yet, the risk model anticipates
scientists providing “definite answers to regulatory problems that
may be urgent and pressing but that science may not be able to solve
categorically.”137 If forensic scientists themselves cannot resolve a
dispute over whether a technique or practice is reliable, how should a
Regulator proceed? The scientific community cannot always provide
the unanimous answers required for risk assessment. Indeed, to
expect them to do so is to misunderstand the nature of a scientific
endeavour, which is always pushing against the boundaries of current
orthodoxy. But, such disputes foster widely discrepant forensic
practices, with techniques deemed acceptable in some countries, or
by some forensic science providers, and rejected by others.
The Regulator has also pointed out the gap left when accreditation
becomes the focus of an organization ignoring other vital issues, such
as the “loss of exhibits; compromise of exhibit integrity; method
failures; poor performance in proficiency tests; and internal
inconsistencies in reports not being identified.”138 There is also the
countervailing difficulty of encouraging innovation and ongoing
development within regulatory parameters. This demands some
measure of regulatory flexibility and pluralism. As Stan Brown and
Sheila Willis have argued, “it is a misconception that best practice
standard protocols must be set that must then be followed by all. That
approach would set forensic science in aspic and be
counterproductive.”139 A difficult balance must be struck between
136. See, e.g., John M. Butler & Carolyn R. Hill, Scientific Issues with Analysis of Low Amounts of
DNA, PROMEGA (2010), http://www.promega.com/resources/profiles-in-dna/2010/scientific-issues-withanalysis-of-low-amounts-of-dna/ [https://perma.cc/X3B6-LMHH].
137. Karolina Zurek, When Lab Results Are Not Sufficient: On the Limitations of Science in Tackling
Modern Rood Regulatory Concerns, 5 SIEPS EUROPEAN POL’Y ANALYSIS, June 2009, at 3.
138. TULLY, supra note 50, at 12.
139. Stan Brown & Sheila Willis, Complexity in Forensic Science, 1 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT.
192, 192–93 (2010).
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strict adherence to quality-assured protocols and ensuring that
practitioners can still innovate and exercise professional judgment in
difficult cases to achieve the optimal outcome.
A risk-based regulatory system does not ensure quality but is
aimed at prioritizing or mitigating crises. The recent scandal at
Randox Testing Services (RTS)140 is the perfect example of postcrisis regulation, with the Regulator called upon to examine the
events at one toxicology laboratory. The Regulator explained,
“Although RTS held accreditation to the appropriate quality standard,
the malpractice was not discovered by the usual quality checks.”141
The laboratory was ISO certified and yet quality control data were
manipulated, resulting in a major police inquiry (with two individuals
facing criminal charges), impacting a reported 10,000 cases that all
now need some degree of re-investigation.142 This is similar to the
food regulatory system in the European Union, which might be
viewed as “a prime example of regulation in response to major crises
rather than in anticipation of everyday problems.”143 In practice,
political crisis induced by a wrongful conviction or public scandal
may be necessary to provoke regulatory intervention,144 but this
reaction may come too late for individuals who cannot be adequately
compensated for their loss of liberty, or a public whose trust in
science and the administration of justice is irreparably damaged.145
Regulators need to be omnipotent and very quick on their feet. In
reality, because “regulatory agencies have limited staff and financial
140. Carole McCartney, Forensic Testing Scandal in UK Widens, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG
(Nov. 22, 2017), https://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2017/11/22/forensic-testing-scandal-in-uk-widens/
[https://perma.cc/L33Z-YREG].
141. Letter from Dr. Gillian Tully, Forensic Science Regulator, to Norman Lamb MP, Chair, Science
&
Technology
Committee,
House
of
Commons
(Nov.
21,
2017),
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/sciencetechnology/Correspondence/171121-Norman-Lamb-to-Forensic-Science-Regulator-Randox.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6GC-Q5ML].
142. TULLY, supra note 50, at 6.
143. Zurek, supra note 137, at 1.
144. Carole McCartney & Stephanie Roberts, Building Institutions to Address Miscarriages of Justice
in England and Wales: “Mission Accomplished?,” 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2013).
145. Michael McConville & Lee Bridges, Keeping Faith with Their Own Convictions: The Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 3, 4 (1994).
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resources, there will always be competition between various
functions for priority.”146 The field of forensic science constantly
faces new challenges, and, realistically, no regulatory system could
always respond or react quickly enough to new “threats.” In addition,
the classic regulatory risk analysis approach relies heavily on
scientific risk assessment, typically taking little (if any) account of
sociological, economic, ethical, or even legal considerations.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of the Regulator in the UK was a significant
innovation, intended to create a generic standard for forensic science
providers with “a light touch” in steering service providers toward
accreditation. While NAS recommended mandatory accreditation for
both laboratories and scientists as well as sanctions against
transgressors (but not automatic exclusion of substandard
evidence),147 the FSR has had to rely upon “soft” implementation.
The adoption of the FSR standards—whether by police forces or
commercial providers—remains voluntary, and consequently, partial.
The Regulator still lacks meaningful enforcement powers, and
despite a promising start, regulation of UK forensic sciences is still
too often patchy, superficial, and lacking teeth. Of course, like the
rest of the UK public sector, the Regulator must contend with
financial stringency. Indeed, the entire criminal justice system—but
forensic science services in particular—is being starved of funds,
with commentators warning that the entire system is on the brink of
collapse.148
Ultimately, the role of the FSR was envisaged as far more
significant than simply setting and monitoring standards, ensuring
accreditation, and dealing with complaints. The overarching goal was
146. OECD, THE GOVERNANCE OF REGULATORS 36 (2014).
147. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 2, at 25–26.
148. See Owen Bowcott, Underfunded Justice System ‘Crumbling’, Top Criminal Barrister Says,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/jan/29/underfundedjustice-system-crumbling-top-criminal-barrister-says [https://perma.cc/8HUY-ML4F].
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to answer those critics who decried the contribution that forensic
science appeared to make toward miscarriages of justice. The FSR,
after all, was born out of recommendations contained in scathing
reports often following high-profile wrongful convictions. The FSR
responds that reducing the risk of quality failings would impede or
prevent “the identification, prosecution[,] and conviction of
offenders.”149 Declaring success in this role would require making
some grand claims, which would be extremely difficult to
satisfactorily demonstrate. There clearly remains an obvious risk of
wrongful convictions with reliance upon unsupervised or unregulated
scientists, or upon unscientific techniques. This risk is increased
when police personnel are working unsupervised and clearly lacking
independence and impartiality.
Poor scientific and professional standards destabilize public
confidence in forensic science and consequently have an impact upon
confidence in the criminal process. Wrongful convictions may
flourish in a culture that fails to scrutinize and question forensic
evidence; instances of flawed science, charlatans, nondisclosure, and
misinterpretation of evidence are easy to locate both domestically
and internationally. In a climate where adversarialism is being
eroded, where science is granted special credence, and expert
witnesses gain credibility as guarantors of “accurate” findings of
guilt, there can then be created a dangerous “technological
tyranny.”150
Given that it is essential that all forensic evidence is reliable and
valid—whether used at trial, during an investigation, or held as
intelligence by law enforcement agencies—there must be systems in
place to ensure the quality of forensic evidence from the very outset
of the criminal process, until the very end. This requires regulation
and oversight of forensic science from the crime scene to the
courtroom; quality assurance standards for the education, training,

149. BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7, at 19.
150. Edward T. Blake, Scientific and Legal Issues Raised by DNA Analysis, in DNA TECHNOLOGY
AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 109, 111 (1989).
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and operation of forensic scientists; and the quality assurance and
accreditation of scientists’ working environments and practices. Yet,
there is clearly a need for more attention to the delivery of forensic
services, practitioner training, standard setting, monitoring, and
implementation across the entire sector. Further, research is required
to determine error rates and limitations of particular techniques and
to develop effective institutional responses to risks of observer bias
and human error.151 Many of the safeguards against wrongful
convictions must reside within fair and rational legal rules and the
professional working cultures. Such safeguards are fostered by
appropriate training and management, and assured by accreditation,
quality assurance, and validation processes among the police,
prosecution, forensic science, judiciary, and advocates. Nevertheless,
whatever care is expended, mistakes are inevitable, and so effective
processes for remedying error remain essential even after conviction.

151. See, e.g., Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making
Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 77 (2006); Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why
Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600, 614 (2006).
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